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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78A-4-703(2)(h) as amended and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

~TATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

The trial court did not abuse it discretion by denying Gary
Armendariz's petition to modify alimony on the basis that the change
of circumstance of retirement was foreseeable at the time of the
divorce.

Standard of Review: Appellate court generally will review a district court's
determination to modify or not to modify a divorce decree for an abuse of discretion.
Fish v Fish, 2016 Ut. App. 125, 379 P.3d 882 (2016); Earhart v Earhart, 2015 Ut App.
308, 365 P.3d 719 (2015). A district court's determination whether a substantial change
of circumstances has occurred is presumptively valid, and our review is therefore limited
to considering whether the district court abused its discretion.

1
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2.

The trial court correctly ruled Gary Armendariz voluntarily retired,
not because of any disability or debilitating injury.

Standard of Review: Where an appellant asserts that the district court's findings
are legally inadequate to support its ruling, we review for correctness. See Fish v Fish,
~

2016 Ut. App. 125, 379 P.3d 882 (2016); Robinson v Robinson, 2010 Utah App. 96,232
P.3d 1081 (2010).
3.

Gary Armendariz voluntarily chose to retire.

Where there is a challenge to the district court's findings of fact, we review for
clear error; where the district court's ruling relies on its interpretation of law, we review
from correctness. See Olsen v Olsen, 2007 Ut. App. 296, (2007) 169 P.3d 765 (2007).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS

1.

Utah Code Ann. §30-3-S(S)(i)(i):

The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders
regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not
foreseeable at the time of the divorce.

2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2.

Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(3) (Michie 1994)

Utah court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders
for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children and their
support, maintenance, health and dental care, or the distribution of the property and
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.

3
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
~

Nature of the Case
This is a domestic relations case involving an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals
over the issue of whether Gary is entitled to terminate his alimony obligation to Pixie,
because of his retirement. The issue on appeal involves whether Gary has proven a
material substantial change of circumstances since the parties' divorce was entered not

vJ

foreseeable at the time of the divorce. Gary argues his retirement was a material
substantial change of circumstance not contemplated in the original decree of divorce and
therefore constitutes a material substantial change of circumstance.
Course of Proceedings
Gary was ordered to pay Pixie $1319 per month alimony pursuant to a Decree of
Divorce entered on June 3, 2005. On October 22, 2014 Gary petitioned the court that his
obligation to pay alimony to Pixie should be terminated as of December 31, 2014. Gary
filed a Motion for Temporary Orders on December 11, 2014 which was heard before the
Domestic Relations Commissioner on January 26, 2015. Gary requested his alimony
obligation be suspended on a temporary basis as he had retired effective January, 2015.
The Commissioner denied Gary's request to suspend alimony pursuant to Rule 106, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, ruling the terms of a decree of divorce remain in effect during
4
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the pendency of the proceedings to modify the original decree.
On May 4, 2015 an Order to Show Cause hearing was held wherein Pixie was
granted a judgment of $5,276 against Gary for non-payment of alimony.
Gary objected to the Commissioner's recommendations and a hearing was held
before District Court Judge, John R. Morris, on August 10, 2015 at which time Gary's
objection was denied and the judgment affirmed.
On February 9, 2017 a pre-trial conference was held. On Mareh 21, 2016 a status
conference was held before District Court Judge, John R. Morris. On July 22, 2016 a
non-jury trial was held. The court ruled there was not a material substantial change of
circumstances warranting a modification of the decree of divorce terminating Gary's
obligation of alimony to Pixie. The court further ruled that Gary voluntarily retired, Gary
was not disabled, and that the pain Gary was experiencing was not debilitating. The court
augmented the previous judgment against Gary for delinquent alimony. The court
awarded Pixie attorney's fees for the augmentation, but did not award attorney's fees on
the Petition to Modify filed by Gary. The Order on Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce
was entered on November 2, 2016 and a Notice of Appeal was filed on December 2,
2016.

5
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VP

Disposition by the Court
On November 2, 2016 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Petition
to Modify Decree of Divorce was entered. District Court Judge, John R. Morris, ruled the
court does not find a substantial material change of circumstances warranting a
termination of alimony to Pixie as it was foreseeable at the time of the divorce Gary
would retir€.
The court further found that the court does not have jurisdiction to tenninate
alimony in this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(8)(i)(i) which provides the court
has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding
alimony based upon a substantial material change of circumstance not foreseeable at the
time of the divorce. The court concluded that it was foreseeable that Gary would retire
\:.IP

but the decree made no provision for termination of alimony upon his retirement.
The decree of divorce provided Pixie would receive one-half of the retirement
benefits earned by Gary during the course of the marriage relating to his CSRS retirement
plan. The court concluded the parties' discussed retirement benefits to be received by
Pixie upon Gary's retirement, but did not terminate the award of alimony to Pixie upon
Gary's retirement. Gary is ordered to continue to pay Pixie $1,319 alimony through
October 31, 2034.
6
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The court awarded Pixie judgment against Gary in the sum of $675 for attorney's
fees in filing an Order to Show Cause to collect delinquent alimony. The court did not
award attorney's fees in connection with the bench trial heard on July 22, 2016.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Gary and Pixie were married on April 8, 1976 (R. at 1,at 12). The parties
were divorced on June 3, 2005 and Gary was ordered to pay $1,319 per
month alimony to Pixie. (R. at 314, 121). Gary petitioned the court to
terminate Pixie's alimony of $1,319 per month. (R. at 544.122). The
Domestic Relations Commissioner denied Gary's Motion to Terminate
Gary's alimony obligation to Pixie during the pendency of the proceedings
on his Petition to Modify. (R. at 710). An Order on Petition to Modify
Decree of Divorce was entered on November 2, 2016 (R. at 1180). Gary
retired in January, 2015 from Hill Air Force Base. (R. at 1322:19). Gary's
date of birth is December 22, 1953 (R. at 1320:22). Gary just turned 61 at
the time he retired in January, 2015 (R. at 1320:23).

2.

Gary admitted that he was not forced to retire from Hill Air Force Base (R.
at 1342:20-24). Gary had worked at Hill Air Force Base for 35 years (R. at
1342-1343 :25).
7
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3.

Gary admitted that he could still be working at Hill Air Force Base today, if
he chose to do so (R. at 1343 :4-7).

4.

Gary worked as a mechanic at Hill Air Force Base (R. at 1343:22-24). Gary
admitted he did not apply for another job that was less demanding than a
mechanic (R. at 1344:2-19).
Gary did not produce a letter from a doctor indicating that he cannot work
or that he is disabled (R. at 1344:20-25; 1345:1-33). Gary does not have
any documentation from a physician that he is not employable (R. at
1345:2-7).

6.

District Court Judge, John Morris, in his ruling stated in order for Gary to
prevail his counsel must show substantial material change in circumstances
not foreseeable at the time of the divorce (R. at 1391:3-10).

7.

District Court Judge, John Morris, stated his conclusion is very simple that
one has to infer what was intended by the contents of the decree. And the
decree specifically addressed the allocation of the parties' income. The
decree also specifically state that alimony would terminate on the happening
of three events. It did not include a fourth, retirement. (R. at 1392:10-15).

8
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8.

District Court Judge, John Morris, in interpreting the parties' original
divorce stated, "And I believe if you read how that was worded in the
context of the entire decree, you find that the court then fully intended for
the alimony to continue until one of those three events occurred. So, I also
don't have any evidence that anything else was intended that the parties
argued that it ought to terminate upon retirement." (R. at 1393: 1-7).

9.

District Court Judge, John Morris, also found that Gary's retirement was
voluntary. It was a voluntary change. Gary self-selected the date of his
retirement. And his ability to then meet his obligations was a direct result of
that self-selection of that voluntary choice to retire. (R. at 1393: 11-14 ); (R.
at 1173, 120).

10.

District Court Judge, John Morris, found that Gary presented no evidence
that he had to retire. (R. at 1393:15-16).

11.

Gary presented no medical evidence of a disability or that he could not
work. (R. at 1393:24-25 to R. at 1394:1-4).

12.

District Court Judge, John Morris, found Gary did not seek alternative
employment. Gary also admitted, under cross-examination, that he did not
seek alternative employment or reassignment. "I don't believe that would
ij;,

9
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have been - - - it would have cost immediate income but he is still accruing
years toward his retirement. He made no effort to see what could be done
and he admitted that. He also admitted that he had no write ups. Nobody
talked to him about the quality of his work, his ability to lift, push, pull,
whatever heavy objects in the course of his work. He basically just decided
I am done, I have had enough and chose to retire." (R. at 1394:5-14).
13.

District Court Judge, John Morris, found that Gary's retirement was a
foreseeable event at the time of the divorce. "So I have a voluntary
retirement and it did reduce his income but I think the fact that his
retirement was a foreseeable event and the timing was his choice, certainly
under those circumstances I can't find that it was a substantial, material and
under foreseeable (unforeseeable). You know a party shouldn't be able to
create his own substantial material event simply by choice that isn't
grounded in anything else." (R. at 1394:18-24).

14.

District Court Judge, John Morris, found that he did not have jurisdiction to
modify the decree. (R. at 1395:9-11).

10
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Gary filed a Petition to Modify the parties' Decree of Divorce alleging a material
substantial change of circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce warranting
a modification of his obligation to pay alimony to Pixie. Gary alleged he has retired from
Hill Air Force Base and because retirement was not listed as an event in which alimony
would _ terminate in the parties' divorce decree the court should find a material substantial
change of circumstance has occurred since the divorce was entered. Gary alleged that a
substantial change of circumstances occurred since the entry of the divorce not
contemplated in the decree itself. Gary relies on Bolliger v Bolliger, 997 P .2d 903, 906
(Ut. App. 2000). In Bolliger, supra, the Court of Appeals found a material substantial
change of circumstances occurred since the parties' Decree of Divorce due to the
husband's forced retirement, resulting in income reduction and the wife's receipt of
social security benefits all constituted a substantial material change of circumstances.
Bolliger, supra, relied upon Durfee v Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah App. 1990)

holding to succeed on a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, the moving party must
show that a substantial change of circumstance has occurred since the entry of the decree
and not contemplated in the decree itself.

11
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In Bolliger v Bolliger, supra, the Court of Appeals explained what is meant by
"contemplated by the divorce decree":

vi

The fact that the parties may have anticipated ( a substantial
material change in circumstances) in their own minds or in
their discussions does not mean that the decree itself
contemplates the change. In order for a material change in
circumstances to be contemplated in a divorce decree there
must be evidence, preferably in the form of the provision
within the decree itself, that the trial court anticipated the
specific change. 997 P .2d at 906
The court in Bolliger, supra went on to explain:
Accordingly, if both the divorce decree and the record are
bereft of any references to the changed circumstances at issue
in the petition to modify, then the subsequent changed
circumstance was not contemplated in the original divorce
decree. 997 P .2d at 906
Under Bolliger v Bolliger, supra because the parties' divorce decree did not state
the effect of retirement on the husband's obligation to pay the wife alimony the
subsequent retirement was a material substantial change of circumstance not
contemplated in the divorce decree itself. Therefore, Gary argues that there has been a
material substantial change of circumstances since the decree as he has retired and the
effect of his retirement was not contemplated in their decree itself.

12
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In 1995 the legislature amended Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(3) (Michie 1994) to state
as follows:
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a
substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable
at the time of the divorce.
Since Bolliger v Bolliger, supra, the courts have interpreted Utah Code Ann. §30~

3-5(8)(i)(i) differently than the Bolliger court. The test now is strictly one of
foreseeability at the time of the divorce and not whether a substantial material change of
circumstance has occurred since the entry of the decree not contemplated in the decree
itself.
In Fish v Fish, 2016 Ut. App. 125, 379 P.3d 882 (2016) the Court of Appeals held
§30-3-5(8)(i)(i) is concerned with whether the alleged changed of circumstances was
"foreseeable", not whether the alleged change of circumstance was actually foreseen and
accounted for in a divorce decree. The court reasoned that a change in income, not
{1y

actually contemplated by the divorce decree, does not automatically require a finding that
a "substantial material change of circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce"
has occurred. The Court commented were it otherwise, creeping inflation could
necessitate recalculation of nearly all alimony awards on an annual or on a biennial basis.
397 P.3d at 388.
13
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~

In Earhart v Earhart, 2015 Ut. App. 308, 365 P.3d 719 (2015), the court found a
vJ

substantial material change of circumstance since the parties' decree of divorce as Mr.
Earhart's annual income was reduced significantly because of the unforeseen loss of a
major client. The court held that an unforeseen and involuntary change of circumstance
had occurred since the decree. These two decisions following Bolliger, supra, adopt a
foreseeability test at the time of the parties' divorce which is consistent with the plain
language of the statute.
In the latest case, McDonald v McDonald, 2017 Ut. App. 13 6, 402 P .3 d 17 8
(2017), the Court of Appeals affirmed the standard whether an event justifies modifying a
parties' decree of divorce is one of foreseeability at the time of the parties' divorce. In
this case, Mr. McDonald filed a Petition to Modify the decree asking the trial court to
terminate his alimony obligation as his former wife's investment of funds generated
substantial income, which he contended constituted a substantial material change in
circumstances since the divorce.
In McDonald the trial court did not find a material change of circumstance since
the parties' divorce warranting a modification of the decree. The court ruled that Mr.
McDonald has not shown a substantial change of circumstance at the time of the decree
that was not foreseen or contemplated by the decree. The trial court found the parties', in
14
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their agreement, contemplated the former wife was going to sell some real property and
then use the proceeds to help pay her living expenses.
Utah has clearly adopted the standard in adjudicating a petition to modify '1:limony
the court must apply a foreseeability standard at the time of the divorce and clearly rejects
that the moving party may show that a substantial material change of circumstance has
occu!'.'fed since the entry of the decree not contemplated in the decree itself.
In this case, the trial court found that Gary's retirement from Hill Air Force Base
was foreseeable as being reasonably anticipated to occur. The parties' divorce
specifically provides that Pixie would receive one-half of the retirement benefits earned
by Gary during the course of the marriage as it relates to his CSRS pension retirement
plan. It is clear that the parties' contemplated Gary would retire and his retirement was
foreseeable at the time of the parties' divorce. Because Gary's retirement was foreseeable
and the decree did not provide for a change in the alimony or Gary's obligation to pay
alimony, Gary is not entitled to terminate alimony.

15
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ARGUMENT

I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
BY DENYING PETITIONER'S PETITION TO MODIFY ALIMONY
ON THE BASIS THAT THE CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCE OF
RETIREMENT WAS FORESEEABLE AT THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE
Gary and Pixie were married on April 8, 1976 (R. at 1 ,12). The parties were
divorced on June 3, 2005. (R. at 314). Gary was ordered to pay $1,319 per month for
alimony to Pixie. (R. at 314,121).
Gary petitioned the court to tenninate Pixie's alimony of $1,319 per month. (R. at
544,122). Gary retired in January, 2015 from Hill Air Force Base. (R. at 1322:19).
Gary's date of birth is December 22, 1953 and he had just turned 61 at the time he retired
in January, 2015. (R. at 1320:22-23).
Gary admitted that he was not forced to retire from Hill Air Force Base. (R. at
1342:20-24). Gary admitted that he could still be working at Hill Air Force Base today, if
he chose to do so. (R. at 1343 :4-7). Gary did not produce a letter from a doctor indicating
that he cannot work or that he is disabled. (R. at 1344:20-25; 1345:1-33). Gary does not
have any documentation from a physician that he is not employable. (R. at 1345: 2-7).
The trial court found that Gary voluntarily retired. The court stated, "I think that
the fact of his retirement was a foreseeable event and the timing was his choice, certainly
v)

under those circumstances I cannot find it was a substantial, material and under
16
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foreseeable (unforeseeable). You know a party should not be able to create his own
substantial material event simply by choice that isn't grounded in anything else." (R. at
1394:18-24).
The Utah Statute granting the court continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial change of
circ1!mstances has changed over the years. In 1994 and the years preceding, the statute
was designated as Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(3) (Michie 1994). The 1994 statute stated:
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent
changes or new orders for the support and maintenance of the
parties, the custody of the children, and their support,
maintenance, health and dental care, or the distribution of the
property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and
necessary.
There are several cases that interpreted the 1994 statute concerned with modifying

~

a decree of divorce. In Stettler v Stettler, 713 P.2d 699, 701, (Utah 1985) the Utah
Supreme Court held:
On a petition for modification of a divorce decree the
threshold requirement for relief is a showing of a substantial
change in circumstances occurring since the entry of the
decree and not contemplated in the decree itself. See 713
P.2d at 701.

fu
17
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In Durfee v Durfee, supra, the Utah Court of Appeals held:
In order for a material change in circumstance to be
contemplated in the divorce decree there must be evidence,
preferably in the form of provision within the decree itself,
that the trial court anticipated the specific change. 796 P .2d at
716
In Bolliger, supra, decided in 2000 the husband filed a petition to modify alimony
seeking to reduce the permanent alimony award. The husband argued that a substantial
change of circumstances had occurred by his unexpected early retirement, which was not
anticipated in the divorce decree and his former wife's receipt of social security also not
anticipated in the divorce decree and not considered in the amount of alimony to his
former wife. The court in Bolliger, supra, ruled to succeed on a petition to modify a
divorce decree the moving party must first show a substantial material change of
vJ

circumstances has occurred since the entry of the decree and not contemplated in the
decree itself. 1997 P .2d 903, 906 (Ut. App. 2000).
The Bolliger court further ruled:
When a future change in circumstances is contemplated by the
trial court in the divorce decree the fullfillment of that future
change will not constitute a material change of circumstances
sufficient to modify the award. 997 P.2d 906.

18
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The Bolliger, supra court articulated what is meant by "contemplated by the
divorce decree":
The fact that the parties may have anticipated a substantial
material change in circumstances in their own minds or in
their discussions does not mean that the decree itself
contemplates the change. In order for a material change in
circumstances to be contemplated in a divorce decree there
must be evidence, preferably in the form of a provision within
the decree itself, that the trial court anticipated the specific
change.
Accordingly, if both the divorce decree and record are bereft
of any reference to the changed circumstance at issue of the
petition to modify, then the subsequent changed circumstance
was not contemplated in the original divorce decree. 997 P.2d
at 906
The court ruling in Bolliger, supra was the husband's forced retirement resulting
in an income reduction and the wife's receipt of social security benefits were substantial
material change of circumstances not foreseen at the time of the divorce.
In the present case, Pixie was awarded tndeterminate alimony for a term, not
exceeding, the length of the parties marriage of 28 years and 11 months. This
indeterminate alimony award terminates early upon Pixie's remarriage, her creation of a
co-habitation relationship with a person of either sex or her death. This indetermine
alimony award is otherwise subject to modification by operation oflaw. (R. at 314, ,I22).
~
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As to retirement, Pixie was awarded a 50% distributive share of Gary's federal
civil employee civil service retirement and was required to prepare the required
distribution order. (R. at 314, ,JI 9). Their decree of divorce, does not state that upon
Gary's retirement his alimony obligation to Pixie terminates. (R. at 314, ,I22).
In Young v Young, 201 P.3d 301(Utah App. 2009) an appeal was taken to the Utah
Court of Appeals when the trial court increased the wife's alimony from $50 to $739 per
month after the divorce the husband became eligible to receive $1,132 per month in social
security benefits. However, the husband was not actually receiving his sum as he was
incarcerated but would receive his social security upon release from incarceration. The
wife filed a petition to modify seeking an increase in her alimony and at the modification
proceedings the trial court found the husband's social security benefit was not expressly
foreseen in the original divorce.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's modification of the decree
4'

awarding the wife an increase in alimony from $50 to $739 citing, Bolliger v Bolliger,

supra. The Court of Appeals stated:
~

A party's receipt of social security benefits can constitute a
substantial material change in circumstance for alimony
modification purposes, so long as not expressly foreseen in
the original divorce decree. 201 P .2d at 304
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In Earhart v Earhart, supra, the Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's granting
the husband's petition to modify the decree of divorce reducing his monthly alimony
obligation from $4,000 to $3,000 and his child support obligation from $3,200 to $2, 348
per month. In this case, the husband lost a major client and his monthly income was
reduced by $7,000 per month.
In reducing the husband's alimony and child support obligation the trial court
concluded there had been a "substantial change of circumstances" that was not anticipated
at the time of the divorce. 365 P.3d at 722.
In Fish v Fish, supra, the Court of Appeals was faced with the issue concerning
modification of an alimony award where the wife had a received a $2.00 per hour wage
increase since the decree of divorce and did that increase in wages constitute a substantial
material change of circumstance not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. Utah Code
Ann. §30-3-5(8)(i)(i).
In his petition to modify decree of divorce regarding alimony, Mr. Fish claimed
because there was no language in the decree referring to an increase income, any increase
is "a change of circumstance not contemplated by the divorce decree itself." 379 P .2d at
888. On appeal Mr. Fish argued there has been a material substantial change of
circumstances not contemplated in the decree of divorce.
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The Court of Appeals was faced squarely with the issue that the decree of divorce
itself did not contemplate an increase of income, and because the wife received an
increase in income did that constitute a material substantial change of circumstances, not
contemplated in the divorce. In Fish the Court of Appeals interpreted Utah Code Ann.
§30-3-5(8)(i)(i) as follows:
We next note that the statute is concerned with whether the
alleged change of circumstance was "foreseeable", not
whether the alleged change of circumstances was actually
foreseen and accounted for in a divorce decree. See U.C.A
§30-3-5(8)(i)(i). It follows that an increase in income not
actually contemplated by a divorce decree does not
automatically require a finding that a "substantial material
change of circumstance not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce" has occurred. See id. We are not aware of any Utah
authority requiring a district court to find such a change has
occurred simply because one party's income has increased
and the divorce decree did not discuss possible increases in
income. Where it otherwise, creeping inflation could
necessitate recalculation of nearly all alimony awards on an
annual or biennial basis. Any such rule would conflict with
the considerable discretion enjoyed by the district court to
determine whether a substantial material change has occurred.
See Earhart, supra.
In short, Jeffrey argues that because Diane's 2014 income (as
calculated using the number of hours per week he believed the
court should have imputed to her) is _higher than her income at
the time of the divorce decree, the district court was required
to find that a substantial, material, and unforeseeable change
in circumstances had occurred. We disagree. Contrary to
Jeffrey's contention, this is a question of discretion, not
22
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correctness. The district court had discretion to determine, as
it did, that in light of all circumstances, Diane's $2.00 per
hour increase in pay over a five year period was not such a
change. 379 P.3d at 888
In McDonald v McDonald, supra, the Court of Appeals of Utah again followed a
foreseeability "test" and not what the divorce decree discussed about possible increases in
income. Mr. McDonald filed a petition to adjust alimony claiming his former wife's new
'

income constituted a substantial material change in circumstance. The Court of Appeals
held the wife's increased income stream was foreseeable from her real estate proceeds
and thus did not warrant modification of the wife's alimony. 402 P.3d at 184.
The husband filed a petition to modify the decree asking the trial court to terminate
his alimony obligation to his former wife. The husband argued the investment from funds
from the sale of the real property and subsequent interest income generated by that
investment constituted a substantial material change in circumstances. The trial court
held that the husband has not shown a substantial change of circumstances from the time
of the decree that was not foreseen or contemplated by the decree and therefore denied
the petition to modify. The trial court further found that the parties' in their agreement
which contained both property division and setting of alimony, contemplated the wife was
going to sell some real property and was going to use the proceeds from the sale of the
real property to pay expenses. The Court of Appeals emphasized that it was adopting a
23
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~

VP

foreseeable standard in interpreting Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(8)(i)(i).
In McDonald, supra the Court of Appeals commented that since 1995 Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(i)(i) has been the controlling statute for alimony modifications.
Reference was made to this statute as regulating a party's right to receive alimony and is
now controlling law. Wilde v Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 445 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
In McDonald, supra, the Court of Appeals emphasized we construe statutes
according to their plain meaning, if possible. The court stated:
Since the best evidence of the legislature's intent is the plain
language of the statute itself, we look first to the plain
language of the statute. In so doing, we presume the
legislature used each word advisedly .... When we can
ascertain the intent of the legislature from the statutory terms
alone, no other interpretive tools are needed, and our task of
the statutory construction is typically at an end. 402 P.3d at
181.
The court in McDonald emphasized:
Thus, the intent of the 1995 amendedment is unambiguous - a
change in circumstances, even a substantial one can only form
the basis for the modification of alimony if that circumstance
was not foreseeable - as opposed as to actually foreseen - "at
the time of the divorce." See U.C.A §30-3-5(8)(i)(i).
Accordingly, we conclude that, as it pertains to alimony, only
a substantial material change in circumstances not
foreseeable, i.e., not reasonably capable of being anticipated
at the time the decree was entered, qualifies as a basis for
modification. See 402 P .3d 178 at 181.
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Gary argues because the financial impact and timing of retirement was "not
reasonably capable of being anticipated at the time the decree was entered" the trial
court's determination that there was no change in circumstances was an abuse of
discretion. (Brief of Appellate pg. 22). Request is made by Gary to remand the case with
instructions to assess the statutory elements including the party's need and the ability to
pay without engaging in an analysis of the decision to retire. (Brief of Appellate pg. 26).
Gary's argument ignores the ruling in McDonald, supra, that the intent of the 1995
amendment is not ambagious, a change in circumstance, even a substantial one, can only
form the basis for the modification of alimony if that circumstance was not foreseeable as
opposed to actually foreseen at the time of the divorce.
Pixie was awarded 50% share of Gary's federal civilian employment retirement,
(R. at 314);(R. at 335, ,I20). It is readily foreseeable that Pixie would be awarded a
substantial portion of Gary's retirement considering the parties were married for 28 years
and 11 months at the time of the divorce, while Gary earned retirement benefits at Hill
Air Force Base. As to timing, Gary was the party that chose to retire in 2015, and
therefore, upon Gary's decision to retire in 2015, the financial consequences of his
retirement were readily foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
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II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED
GARY ARMENDARIZ VOLUNTARILY RETIRED, NOT
BECAUSE OF ANY DISABILITY OR DEBILITATING INJURY

Pixie was entitled to receive a Woodward share of Gary's retirement. These
parties had a 28 year and 11 month marriage at the time of their divorce wherein Gary
earned retirement benefits at Hill Air Force Base. It was foreseeable at the time of the
parties' divorce that Gary would retire and that Pixie would receive a portion of his
retirement. Gary's retirement was a voluntary change, he self selected the date of his
retirement. (R. at 1393:11-12).
Gary nor his counsel, at the time of the divorce, made any provision in the decree
as to how Gary's retirement from Hill Air Force Base would effect his alimony obligation
to Pixie. The foreseeability test set forth in McDonald, supra, governs this situation. A
change in circumstance, even a substantial one, can only form the basis for the
modification of alimony if that circumstance was not foreseeable, as to opposed to
actually foreseen, at the time of the divorce. Only a substantial material change in
circumstances not foreseeable, not reasonably capable of being anticipated at the time the
decree was entered, qualifies as a basis for modification. Gary could have reasonably
anticipated that at the time he retired Pixie would receive a substantial portion of his
retirement benefits and the decree made no provision for modification of alimony upon
26
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his retirement.
III. PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY CHOSE TO RETIRE

~

Gary testified that he was not forced to retire. (R. at 1342). Gary admitted that his
retirement was voluntary on his part. (R. at 1342:20-21). Gary further admitted that he
could still be working at Hill Air Force Base today if chose. (R. at 1343, 4-5). Gary did
. not apply for any other jobs from his present employment as a mechanic at Hill Air Force
Base. (R. at 1344:2-11 ). Gary admitted that there was a possibility he could have
worked passing out tools at the tool crib and taking care of finding tools for individuals
that needed tools. (R. at 1344:12-15). Gary presented no verification from any physician
saying that he was disabled. (R. at 1344:20-22). Gary had no documentation from any
physician that he was not employable. (R. at 1345 :7).
The trial court found no evidence that Gary had to retire. "We do not have a riff or
reduction in force. We have no strong evidence whatsoever, no persuasive evidence of a
debilitating injury to the Gary." (R. at 107:15-18).
The court further found without having expert medical testimony it could not
evaluate anything Gary says nor can the trial court evaluate the pictures Gary has offered
and reach a conclusion Gary has a permanent disability and is unable to work. (R. at
1393 :24-25; at 1394: 1-4).
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CONCLUSION

The court should rule there has not been a material substantial change of
circumstances since the parties' decree of divorce not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce warranting termination of alimony. Gary knew when he retired Pixie would
receive a portion of his retirement because of their lengthy marriage while he was
employed at Hill Air Force Base. Yet, Gary made no provision in the divorce decree how
his retirement would effect his obligation to pay alimony. Gary voluntarily chose to retire
and could still be working today. Gary presented no evidence that he was not capable of
employment or that he suffered any disability. Gary's appeal should be denied.
DATED this

/]}J;ofNovember, 2017.

Attorney for Respondent/Appelle
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ADDENDUM
1.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law.

2.

Order on Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce.
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ROBERT L. NEELEY [2373)
Attorney for Respondent
2485 Grant Avenue, #200
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone No.: 801.621.3646
Facsimile No.: 801.621.3652

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT

GARY LYNN ARMENDARIZ,

ORDER ON PETITION TO
MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,
vs
PIXIE MARIE ARMENDARIZ,
Respondent.

Case No.: 044700632
Judge: Morris
Commissioner: Dillon

IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE, a non-jury trial on Petitioner and
vJ

Respondent's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce came on regularly for hearing on
July 22, 2016 before the Honorable John R. Morris, District Court Judge. Petitioner was
personally present and represented by his attorney, Robert L. Froerer. Respondent was
personally present and represented by her attorney, Robert L. Neeley. Petitioner and
Respondent having been sworn in and testified; and the court having received exhibits
from both parties; and having heard the arguments and representations of counsel; and
having reviewed the pleadings on file; and being fully advised in the matter; and has
Order on Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce
Armendariz v Armendariz
Case No.: 044700632
Page No.: 1
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entered its findings of fact; hereby makes the following Order on Petition to Modify
Decree of Divorce:
1.CIRCUMSTANCES: The court does not find a material substantial change of

circumstance warranting a termination of alimony to Respondent in the present
sum of $1319 per month as it was foreseeable at the time of the divorce
Petitioner would retire but made no provision upon his retirement that alimony to
Respondent would terminate.
2.TERMINATION: The court does not have jurisdiction to terminate alimony in

this case as pursuant to U.C.A §30-3-5(8)(i)(i) provides the court has continuing
jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony
based upon a substantial material change of circumstances not foreseeable at
the time of the divorce. The court concludes that it was foreseeable that
Petitioner would retire but made no adjustment or provision for termination of
alimony upon his retirement.
3.RETIREMENT: The parties Decree of Divorce specifically provides, upon

stipulation of the parties, that Respondent would receive one-half of the
retirement benefits earned by Petitioner during the course of the parties'
marriage relating to his CSRS retirement plan.
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4.The court concludes the parties discussed retirement benefits to be received by
Respondent upon Petitioner's retirement but did not modify, terminate, or amend
the award of alimony to Respondent upon Petitioner's retirement. Petitioner is
ordered to continue to pay Respondent $1319 per month alimony through
October 31, 2034.
5.The court dismisses for no cause of action Respondent's Petition to have
Petitioner to pay his alimony obligation by transferring from his bank account to
Respondent's bank account the monthly alimony award.
6.JUDGMENT 1: The court awards Respondent judgment against Petitioner for
$7760 for retirement benefits she did not receive from January 1, 2015 through
and including August 31, 2015 for which she was entitled.
?.JUDGMENT 2: The court awards judgment to Respondent against Petitioner in
the sum of $26,380 for delinquent alimony from January 1, 2015 through and
including August 31, 2016, a total of 20 months payable at $1319 per month.
a.JUDGMENT 3: The court awards Respondent a judgment against Petitioner in
the sum of $675 as and for attorney's fees she incurred in filing an Order to Show
Cause to collect delinquent alimony.
9.Respondent may seek to collect Judgment of $7,760 retirement benefits,
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judgment for attorney fees of $675, and judgment for $26,380 together with
ongoing (prospective) alimony of $1319 per month from the Office of Personal
Management (OPM) pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code Section 838.225, 838.234 and
838.235.
10.ATTORNEY'S FEES: The court does not award attorney's fees to either party
in connection with the bench trial heard on July 22, 2016.
ENTERED BY THE COURT ON THE DATE AS INDICATED
BY THE COURT'S SEAL ON TOP OF THE FIRST PAGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT
/S/ ROBERT FROERER

11/1/16

ROBERTFROERER
Attorney for Petitioner
Electronically signed by Robert L. Neeley
with permission of Robert Froerer.

DATED
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ROBERT L. NEELEY [2373]
Attorney for Respondent
2485 Grant Avenue, #200
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone No.: 801.621.3646
Facsimile No.: 801.621.3652

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT

GARY LYNN ARMENDARIZ,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,
vs
PIXIE MARIE ARMENDARIZ,

Respondent.

Case No.: 044700632
Judge: Morris
Commissioner: Dillon

IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE, a non-jury trial on Petitioner and

Respondent's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce came on regularly for hearing on
r

July 22, 2016 before the Honorable John R. Morris, District Court Judge. Petitioner was
personally present and represented by his attorney, Robert L. Froerer. Respondent was
personally present and represented by her attorney, Robert L. Neeley. Petitioner and
Respondent having been sworn in and testified; and the court having received exhibits
from both parties; and having heard the arguments and representations of counsel; and
having reviewed the pleadings on file; and being fully advised in the matter; hereby
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Armendariz v Armendariz
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makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Petitioner and Respondent were divorced in the above-entitled case on June 3,
2005.
2.Pursuant to paragraph 19 of the parties' Decree of Divorce Respondent was
awarded a 50% distributive share of Petitioner's Federal Civilian Employee Civil
Service Retirement System (CSRS) account as of the date of the parties' Decree
of Divorce in this action.
3.Pursuant to paragraph 21 of the parties' Decree of Divorce Respondent was
awarded alimony from Petitioner in the sum of $1319 per month commencing
March, 2005.
4.The court finds the parties were married for 28 years and 11 months for a total
of 347 months. The indeterminate alimony award to Respondent was granted for
a term, not exceeding, the length of the parties' marriage.
5.Pursuant to paragraph 22 of the parties' Decree of Divorce the indeterminate
alimony award shall terminate early upon the Respondent's remarriage, her
creation of a co-habitation relationship with a person of either sex or upon her
death.
6.The court finds that Respondent has not remarried and is not in a co-habitation
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relationship with a person of either sex and neither party has died.
7. The court finds that it was foreseeable that Petitioner would retire from Hill Air
Force Base and that Respondent would receive a 50% share of Petitioner's Civil
Service Retirement System (CSRS) acquired during the course of the parties'
marriage.
8.Petitioner at the time of the parties' divorce was aware he was going to retire
and that his former spouse, Respondent, would receive a substantial percentage
of his retirement.
9.The parties' Decree of Divorce makes no reference that upon Petitioner's
retirement his obligation to pay alimony would be reduced or otherwise
terminated.
1O.The court finds that it was foreseeable to Petitioner he would retire and his
former spouse, Respondent, would receive a large portion of his retirement.
11. The court finds the parties' divorce does not indicate that upon Petitioner's
retirement that his obligation to pay alimony would terminate.
12.The court finds that Petitioner retired on January 1, 2015 from Hill Air Force
Base, Utah and became eligible to receive his Civil Service Retirement known as
Civil Service Retirement System retirement plan (CSRS).
13.The court finds that Respondent began to receive her court ordered share of

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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Petitioner's CSRS retirement on September 1, 2015.
~

14.The court finds Petitioner received the full share of the retirement and no
funds were withheld until November 1, 2015.
15. The court finds that Respondent has received her share of Petitioner's
retirement commencing September 1, 2015 in the correct amount of $1327.78
minus survival benefit premium and tax deductions resulting in a net monthly pay
of $970.
16. The court finds Petitioner having received all of his retirement from January 1,
2015 through August 31, 2015 owes Respondent eight months of retirement from
~

January 1, 2015 through August 31, 2015 in the sum of $970 per month for a
total sum of $7760.
17.The court finds Petitioner has failed to pay alimony to Respondent in the sum
of $1319 per month effective upon his retirement of January 1, 2015 to the
present date.
41,

18.The court finds that a judgment granted on May 4, 2015 for a period of four
months for delinquent alimony in the sum of $5276 (4x1319) and Respondent is
entitled to augment that judgment for the period of May 1, 2015 to August 31,
2016, a period of 16 months.
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19.The court finds that Petitioner is delinquent in alimony to Respondent Pixie
Armendariz in the sum of $26,380, a total of 20 months from January 1, 2015
through August 31, 2016.
20.The court finds that Petitioner voluntarily chose to retire on January 1, 2015.
21.The court finds the parties stipulated in their Decree of Divorce that
Respondent was entitled to one-half of Petitioner's CSRS retirement accrued
during the course of the parties' marriage.
V,

22.The court finds that Petitioner incurred attorney's fees of $675 for the Order to
Show Cause held on May 4, 2015 to collect delinquent alimony payments from
v;)

January 1, 2015 through April 30, 2015.
The court having entered his Findings of Fact now enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

23. The court does not find a material substantial change of circumstance
warranting a termination of alimony to Respondent in the sum of $1319 per
month as it was foreseeable at the time of the divorce Petitioner would retire but
made no provision upon his retirement that alimony to Respondent would
terminate.
24.The court does not have jurisdiction to terminate alimony in this case as
pursuant to U.C.A §30-3-S(B)(i)(i) provides the court has continuing jurisdiction to
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make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based upon a
substantial material change of circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce.

The court concludes that it was foreseeable that Petitioner would retire

but made no adjustment or provision for termination of alimony upon his
retirement.
25.The parties Decree of Divorce specifically provides, upon stipulation of the
parties, that Respondent would receive one-half of the retirement benefits earned
by Petitioner during the course of the parties' marriage relating to his CSRS
retirement plan.
26. The court concludes the parties discussed retirement benefits to be received
by Respondent upon Petitioner's retirement but did not modify, terminate, or
amend the award of alimony to Respondent upon Petitioner's retirement.
Petitioner is ordered to continue to pay Respondent $1319 per month alimony
through October 31, 2034.
27.The court dismisses for no cause of action Respondent's Petition have
~

Petitioner to pay his alimony obligation by transferring from his bank account to
her bank account the monthly alimony award for no cause of action.
28. The court awards Respondent judgment against Petitioner for $7760 for
retirement benefits she did not receive from January 1, 2015 through and
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including August 31, 2015 for which she was entitled.
29.The court awards judgment to Respondent against Petitioner in the sum of
$26,380 for delinquent alimony from January 1, 2015 through and including
August 31, 2016 a total of 20 months payable at $1319 per month.

30.The court awards Respondent a judgment against Petitioner in the sum of
$675 as and for attorney's fees she incurred in filing an Order to Show Cause to
collect delinquent alimony.
31.Respondent may seek to collect Judgment of $7,760 retirement benefits,
judgment for attorney fees of $675, and judgment for $26,380 together with
ongoing (prospective) alimony of $1319 per month from the Office of Personal
Management (OPM) pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code Section 838.225, 838.234 and
838.235.
32.The court does not award attorney's fees to either party in connection with the
bench trial heard on July 22, 2016.
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